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My thanks to participants  at a semninar  on the Swedish  pension reform at the World
Bank in May 1998. I have also benefited from discussions  with, and reading the work of
Axel B6rsch Supan, Elsa Fomero, Louise Fox, Edward Palmer, Salvador Valdes-Prieto,
Michal  Rutkowski,  Annika Sunden,  Anita Schwarz and Patrick Wiese on this topic. Robert
Palacios  and Edward Whitehouse edited  the paper.
This study is part of the World Bank's Pension Reform Primer a comprehensive,
up-to-date resource for people designing and implementing pension reforms around the
world. Details are available  from www.worldbank-org/pensions.
2Foreword
This is the first of what may be several papers in the Pension Primer series on the subject
of notional accounts.  It takes  a specific view on this  approach to  reform unfunded
systems, and the assessment may not be universal.  The same is likely to apply to the
subsequent Primer paper on Notional Accounts by  Edward Palmer.  While Notional
Accounts  reforms  have  already  been  implemented in  various  countries,  including
Sweden, Latvia, Italy and Poland, the experience is very recent and hence the jury is still
out as to whether this constitutes a useful alternative to parametric reforms of unfunded
schemes, a  useful  transition  to  partial funding,  or  even a  useful  alternative to  the
prefunding of pension commitments.  Thus, the reader is encouraged to read through the
primer papers on this topic as they become available, and to form his own opinion - as he
or she always should.
Robert Holzmann
Director, Social Protection
Head of Task Force - Pension Primer
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Faced with  the  fiscal unsustainability of  many unfunded (pay-as-you-go)  public
pension programmes around the  world - a  problem that  has  been highlighted and
exacerbated by  demographic ageing in  several countries - governments have  been
searching for effective  and feasible  pension reform strategies. 1 The traditional approach to
pension reform, recently restated by Chand and Jaeger (1996),  is to  'fix up' the existing
unfunded pension programme by 'parametric'  reforms. Such reforms include  raising  the age
at which an individual  first becomes eligible  for the pension, cutting benefit accrual rates,
decoupling  pension increments  from the growth of real earnings,  and so on. 2
Although any pension reform must almost certainly  embody some elements of this
strategy,  the argument against  wholesale reliance on an incremental  process of this type is
that it does not challenge  the unfunded nature of existing  pension programmes. As is well
known, so long as dynamic  efficiency  holds (on which see, for example,  Abel etaL, 1989,  and
Feldstein, 1996),  it is efficient  to fund pension programmes  rather than to finance on a pay-
as-you-go (unfunded) basis.  Moreover, by funding, a stock of assets is accumulated to
match the prospective liabilities  of the scheme.  This should in principle ameliorate the
problem of fiscal sustainability  in the face of long-run trends such as demographic  ageing.
The difficulty of course with this strategy for a  country with an existing pay-as-you-go
1  Throughout this paper I use the terminology 'pensions' and 'public pensions' in the European sense,
as opposed  to the US  terminology  of 'social  security'  and  (private)  'pensions'.
2  Schwarz  and Demirgu,-Kunt (1999)  survey  recent pension reforms around the world  Disney (1999)
focuses on OECD countries,  evaluating  different reforTn  strategies.
5scheme  is the transition  cost for generations  that also  have to finance  existing,  unfunded,
liabilities.  However  it should  be borne  in mind  that arty  reform  process  designed  to restore
fiscal  sustainability  will reduce  average  pension  benefits  for some  generations.  Moreover,
there is also a policy credibility  question arising  from incremental  parametric  reforms
because  time  horizons  of governments  are short and  policy  can  be reversed,  as illustrated  by
recent  experience  m countries  such  as Germany  and  Japan. 3
This  difficulty  of making  reforms  of pay-as-you-go  pension  schemes  'stick'  has led  to
discussion  of  whether constitutional  'rules' could be  introduced governing  pension
programmes  (analogous  to  the establishment  of an independent  central  bank to make
monetary  policy  decisions):  see  Diamond  (1997).  Such  rules  could,  for example,  tie benefit
generosity  or retirement  age  explicitly  to demographic  parameters  such  as expected  longevity
or the projected  trajectory  of fertility.  Again,  however,  the empirical  evidence  suggests  that
much of the problem in reforming  pensions  lies in changing  existng  constitutional  public
pension 'rules'  (for  example that  benefits must fully replace earnings) and  that
constitutionality  per  se  is not the solution.  Instead,  incorporating  demographic  predictions
into the pension  calculation  directly  might  be a better  response. This  is, of course,  exactly
what  a private  annuity  market  should  do.
An influential  strategy  of pension  reform,  championed  by the World  Bank (1994),4
decouples  the 'redistributive'  component  of pensions  from the 'insurance'  component. In
this framework,  a 'multipillar'  pension  programme  is envisaged. This would  consist,  in
equilibrium,  of: a first pillar  of public,  unfunded,  benefits  simply  for income  maintenance
(redistributive)  purposes; a  mandatory  second pillar, preferably  funded and privately
managed,  providing  pension benefits related  to  contributions  by individuals  or  their
employers;  and, perhaps,  a third  pillar  of voluntary,  private,  provision. This is the model
exemplified  by  Anglo-Saxon  countries  such  as Australia  and  the United  Kingdom,  as well  as
the Netherlands. 5 In its more  radical  form,  it also  underpins  the Latin  American  reforms,
especially  that of Chile. It contrasts  with the traditional  'Bismarckian'  scheme  in which  the
3  For a survey  and development  of a public  choice  framework  for analysing  unfunded  public  pension
programmes,  see  Disney,  Chapter  9. McHale  (1999)  shows  the large  effects  recent  reforms  in six  major  OECD
countries  have  had on the value  of pension  benefits.
4  Holzmann  (2000)  restates  the case  using  more  recent  data.
5  See  Flanagan  (1999)  for a description  of the system  in Australia  and  Whitehouse  (1998)  on the United
Kingdom.
6first two pillars  are combined  in an unfunded  public programme  that has the prinary
purpose  of earnings  replacement  at  retirement.
The attractions  of a reform  that separates  the redistribution  and insurance  features
are  straightforward,  as are its drawbacks.  By switching  to a substantial  funded  component  to
pension  provision,  the economy  takes advantage  of dynamic  efficiency. By focussing  on
redistribution  in the first pillar,  the government  still has scope  for 'political'  decisions,  for
example  concerning  generosity  to the poorest. Moreover,  separating  out and perhaps
'privatising'  the 'insurance'  aspect of pensions  allows  the more general  task of income
replacement  in old age to  be taken out of the  hands of the political  process since
governments  rarely  expropriate  private  property  rights. 6 Of course,  the drawback  is again
the cost of the transition:  some generations  will have to  provide both for their own
retirement  and for existing  unfunded  liabilities.  Many living  generations  may be slightly
worse  off in such  a reform  strategy:  it all  depends  on the extent  to which  dynamic  efficiency
holds. 7 For this reason, many OECD governments in particular have been reluctant to
follow  the lead  of countries  such as Chile  and  the United  Kingdom  in shifting  to a pension
system  dominated  by funded,  largely  private,  provision.  Instead,  private  funded  components
are still  regarded  as a 'top up' to existing  unfunded  arrangements  (perhaps  'parametrically'
reformed)  rather  than  the centrepiece  of a new  pension  strategy.
In recent  years,  a third  pension  reform  strategy  has emerged.  It is exemplified  by  the
pension  reforms  in Latvia,  Poland  and Sweden  and,  implicitly,  in the 'Dini  reform'  in Italy.!
It is actively  under discussion  in other countries.  In this strategy,  the bulk of the public
unfunded  system  is reconstituted  into a scheme  of individual  retirement  accounts.  These  are
known  as 'notional  accounts'  because  they are not funded  per  se  but nevertheless  represent
individualised  claims  on future  public  resources. The idea is that these notional  accounts
6  Of course,  governments  may  affect  the value  of these  rights  by, for example,  changing  the tax
treatment  of private  pensions,  as has recently  been  done  in the United  Kingdom:  see  Whitehouse  (1998,
1999a).  Social  assistance  progranmmes  can  also  affect  the return  to private  pension  savings  of low-income
workers  by  reducing  benefits  as  pension  income  increases.  So  changes  to these  means  tests  can  also  affect  the
value  of  private  pension  rights  indirectly.
7  For  somewhat  different  views  of this  generational  incidence  based  on simulations,  see  for example,
Feldstein  and  Samwick  (1998),  Kotlikoff  (1998),  Kotlikoff,  Smetters  and  Walliser  (1998),  Holzmann  (1998)  and
Miles  and  Iben  (1999).  Of course,  given  dynamic  efficiency,  it is misleading  to talk  of this  cost  as a 'double
burden',  despite  the  frequent  use  of  this  term  in commnentaries  on  pension  reform.
8  Named  after  the  Prime  Minister  involved  in introducing  the  reform.  In contrast,  to the 'Dlini'  reform,
the  'Amato'  reform  in 1992  was  a conventional,  albeit  radical,  'parametric'  reform.  'Implicitly'  is used  because
individualisation  of  pension  accounts  was  not so  central  to the  Italian  reform  strategy.
7mimic  a private  defined  contribution  system  of individualised  accounts,  with the 'return'  on
such accounts  explicitly  linked  by law to a formula  which takes account  of current and
prospective  demographic  and productivity  change. This reform  appears  to eliminate  the
unsustainabihty  of existing  unfunded  defined  benefit  plans  by legally  enforcing  a variant  of
the Aaron-Samuelson  condition  that links the feasible  return to  an unfunded  pension
programme  to real  wage  bill  growth  (for  more  discussion  of this  condition,  see  below).
Advocates  of this third approach,  such as Palmer (1999),  point to the following
attractions  of the strategy:
v  It overcomes  issues  of political  feasibility  and policy  inconsistency  anrsing  from
'parametric  reforms'  and introduces  a constitutional  or legal  link  to sustainability
through the  pension calculation  rather than through some overall non-
governmental  constitutional  body.
*  It returns  an 'insurance'  component  to the public  pension  programme  by linking
benefits  to contributions.  This rules  out perverse  redistributive  features  in the
scheme  and (it  is argued)  gives  individuals  a greater  incentive  to work  or continue
to work  since  economic  activity  increases  pension  rights  in a transparent  manner.
As  a consequence,  the gains  of a parametric  reform  (such  as deferring  retirement
age)  may be achieved  through  incentives  rather than by politically  contentious
legislation.
*  Linking  accruals  and  pension  calculations  to objective  signals  of macroeconomic
sustainability,  such  as the growth  of  the wage  bill  and  improvements  in longevity,
enhances  the credibility  of the fiscal  system.
•  Leaving  aside  the problem  of the transition  to a new system  (which  is common
to all  reforms),  many  of these  features  are shared  by a funded  scheme.  However,
advocates  of  notional accounts argue that they have desirable  insurance
properties  if the volatility  of the 'return' on notional  accounts  (real  wage  bill
growth)  is lower  than the volatility  of return on the funded scheme  (which
depends  on portfolio  choice  and the capital  market). A mixture  of funded  and
unfunded  components  to the programme  may be even better. Therefore,  the
8Polish proposals,  which include both funded and notional account components,
were entitled 'Security  through Diversity'. 9
It is the task of this paper to examine  these arguments  concerning reforms based on
notional accounts,  evaluating  both this collection of claims  and the counter-arguments. The
next section provides a very brief  account of the evolution of notional accounts schemes  and
their features in  Italy, Latvia, Sweden and Poland.  However, the central concern of the
paper is a generic scheme of this type, rather than the adequacy of its operation in any
particular country. The third section examines  the wdfar economics of such a scheme. In
particular,  it asks in what sense, if any, such a scheme is fair', a term often used by notional
accounts' proponents.  This section also examines the inwaraxe  aspect of providing  at least
some component of the pension programme in the form of notional accounts.
Section 4 focuses on macroeconomic issues.  First it examines the issue of f&a1
utanii  and  asks whether notional  account  systems do  in  fact  provide  a  better
framework  than a 'conventional' unfunded, defined benefit plan.  Here I have particularly
benefited from the detailed analysis  in Valdes-Prieto (1999)  and the summary discussion  of
Schwarz and Valdes-Prieto (1999).  The section also re-examines  the  issue of political
credibility raised previously.  Section 5  then  examines microeconomic issues, and  in
particular  the argument  that greater  transparency affects  retirement and scheme  participation
incentives.  Section 6 concludes.  Its main finding is that, despite politically attractive
features, the superiority of a reform based on notional accounts over a combination of
'parametric' reforms and the switch to an explicitly  funded component remains unproven.
Indeed the latter, combination  strategy  is likely  to be superior.
2.  Notional  accounts:  evolution  and  implementation
Background: Buchanan's proposal and ~point' systems
As Valdes-Prieto (1999) points out, an early proponent of a scheme resembling
notional accounts  was Buchanan (1968). He suggested  replacing  social security  payroll  taxes
in the United State by mandatory  individual  purchases of social security 'bonds'. When the
individual retired, these bonds would be credited with a rate of interest compounded over
9  Hausner  (1998)  and  Office  of the Government  Plenipotentiary  for Social  Security  Reform  (1997).
9the working life.  This notional return would be the larger of the rate of interest on long-
term US Treasury bonds or the rate of  growth of  GNP.  This accumulation of bond
purchases  with credited  interest  was  the individual's  'notional  capital'. However, and in a key
contrast to subsequent schemes  as implemented,  at retirement the individual  would have to
purchase a uriaNe  nnity, with annual payouts related to the subsequent  rate of growth of
GNP.  This would take care of subsequent shocks that affected  the capacity of the fiscal
system to  deliver pension benefits.  It would have been a natural extension to  make an
explicit  Aaron-Samuelson  condition the criterion for crediting interest and for determining
the value of the variable  annuity at any point im  time.  It is to be presumed that the absence
of  any demographic pressure together with  the  potential complexity of  the  proposal
precluded any extended discussion of the proposal in that period.  Boskin et aL (1988),
however, did subsequently  propose a scheme of unfunded 'personal security accounts' for
the United States in which annuity rates would be guaranteed  but explicitly  linked to long-
term actuarial  projections  and prospective  economic  conditions.'"
Valdes-Prieto  (1999)  also points to a second, indirect, source of the idea of notional
accounts,  m the 'point'-based  systems  underlying  unfunded pension schemes  in France since
1945  and the current national  scheme in Germany  since 1992. In each scheme, contributors
accumulate  personal 'points' and the pension is determined  in large part by the accumulated
sum of points at retirement. In Germany,  the number of points accumulated  in each year
depends on the ratio of an individual's  wage relative  to the average  wage in that year.  In
France the prospective annuity value of each year's points is set in each time period by
reference  to some concept of fiscal balance in each pension institution. In both schemes,
points are converted into a pension at retirement,  which is subsequently  revalued  in line with
average  net  wages in Germany (net of social  security  contributions)  and by prices in France.
In the German case,  there is a mechanism by which the pension conversion  incorporates
forecast  changes  in average  life expectancy  at age 65 but the demographic  adjustment  is only
partial. The French scheme revalues  points in line with current financial  solvency. But the
10  There has, however, been growth in employer-run pensions with a  formula similar to  notional
accounts in the United States. Employer and employee  contributions accrue in an individual  account which
earns a notional interest rate.  These schemes, known as cash balance  plans, are fnanced in the same  way as
defined benefit plans: the  employer  is responsible  for making good any shortfall in the fund, in this case
between the actual rate of return earned in the market and the notional return credited to pension accounts.
See Schieber,  Dunn and Wray (1998)  for a discussion.
10measure of solvency  is not linked systematically  to  demographic change and therefore to
long-run sustainability.
The final influence on  the development of notional accounts is, of course, the
introduction of individual retirement saving accounts as part of a  comprehensive social
security reform in  countries such as Chile and the United Kingdom.  In  the United
Kingdom, for example, individuals  have been allowed to opt  out of a part of the social
security system since 1988. Instead, part of their payroll  tax contribution is credited to an
individual  account known as a personal pension.  (Indeed,  most reforms based on notional
accounts  in practice  do contain a small component of funded individual  accounts in addition
to the unfunded accounts." 1)
Italy
The case for reform of public pensions was apparent in Italy long before a sequence
of reforms was enacted starting in the early 1990s. Prior to  1992, excessive  accrual rates
under the 'normal' public pension programme, coupled with generous additional  incentives
known as 'seniority  pensions' had combined to push effective  contribution rates to over 30
per cent with the system still running a deficit.  Projected demographic ageing suggested
contribution rates rising to 45 per cent; restoring actuarial balance would have shifted the
equilibrium  contribution rate above 50 per cent once the 'baby boom' generation  retired en
ruse  (see  Cozzolino and Schioppa  Kostoris, 1995).
The first set of reforms (the 'Amato' reforms of 1992, named after the then Prime
Minster) were a standard 'parametric' response to the problem, with an explicit increase  in
the retirement age,  cuts in accrual  factors,  indexation arrangements,  and so on.  The second
set  of reforms (the lDini' reforms of  1995) attempted to  establish a different form  of
pension provision, by linking benefits much more closely  to  contributions.  Whereas the
Amato reforms retained a notional defined benefit structure, while cutting accrual rates,
rising retirement age etc, the Dini reforms explicitly  made pension entitlements conditional
on the accumulated  sum of contributions  paid. The contributions would be revalued  in line
1t  The  Chilean  reforn  is well  known;  for a discussion  of changes  in the United  Kingdom,  see  Disney
and  Whitehouse  (1992)  and  Whitehouse  (1998).  For  an overview  of transitions  to funded  individual  account-
based  pension  schemes,  see  Palacios  and  Whitehouse  (1998).
11with a moving  average  of GDP growth, and the annuity would be calculated  as a product of
this revaluation  and a 'transformation  coefficient'  conditional  on the age of retirement. The
latter should also reflect the  predicted average longevity of the  cohort  and  expected
productivity growth.  The marginal  accrual  would rise with age of retirement. Subsequent
pensions would be indexed  in a standard  fashion:  either to earnings  growth or price inflation,
with a presumption  that the system  would ultimately  index  to the latter.
The scheme  also tidied up various other features of the existing  system (for example,
the rather more privileged  position of some public sector workers).  Although the new
system was implemented  in January 1996, all individuals  with 18 years of contributions at
that  time remained under  the old  scheme.  People with between 1 and  18 years of
contributions  will retire with a weighted  mixture of pre- and post-reform benefits. Thus the
transition period from the old to the new scheme  was extremely  long.
There are three reasons for thinking  that the Dini reform may not eliminate  the risk
of fiscal  crisis in Italy arising  from excessive  pension expenditure. First, the long transition
period means that the unsustainability  of the existing system will continue to  domninate
pension finances for  many years to  come.  Second, the  'transformation coefficient' at
annuitisation  fixes  the pension. Any unexpected  adverse  assumptions  post-retirement  (such
as slowing productivity growth or increasing longevity)  would have to  be borne by the
general  taxpayer. And third, while  the original  scheme was already  in deficit on 1995,  under
the Dini reform, individuals  would be credited  with a marginal  contribution based on the
'equilibrium'  contribution in a pay-as-you-go  scheme. Actual contribution  rates were lower,
falling short of the level required to balance  the existing scheme's finances (see Hamann,
1997). In the light of these developments,  further attempts to reform the programme  have
been made in  1999 in order to accelerate  the implementation of the 'contribution-based'
scheme.
Lafta
Latvia was the  first country to  introduce a  pension reform based explicitly on
notional accounts,  in 1995-96,  although  the developments  there were strongly  influenced  by
those involved in the subsequent Swedish  reform (Fox and Palmer, 1999). This reform,
which replaced a  standard unfunded defined benefit programme, was intended to  be
12multipillar,  along World Bank lines.  However, the initial focus has been on establishing a
basic pillar of unfunded  individual pension accounts in  which  notional contributions
accumulate." 2 These accounts are not funded and do not earn a market return. Instead, each
individual's  'accumulated'  contributions are revalued annually  in line with the growth of the
contribution base, this being interpreted as the feasible  'return' to an unfunded progranmme.
The reform specifies  that an annual statement of the notional pension capital should be
provided to each scheme  participant.
There is no fixed  retirement age  in this system  of notional accounts,  although  there is
a minimum retirement age and a minimum social  pension, which play key roles (see below).
At the individual's  chosen retirement date, subject to this minimum constraint, the pension
level is calculated by reference to  accumulated, revalued, contributions on the basis of
projected life expectancy at the  date  of  retirement  (the average life expectancies are
published  and are known as the G-values)." 3 By deferring  retirement,  the individual  increases
the value of the account and thus the average  pension. The gains  to deferring  are substantial
(at least, relative  to the pre-existing system):  for example a person on average eamings, by
deferring  retirement from age 60 to 70, increases  their replacement  rate by 40 pexngejui?s
(Fox and Palmer, 1999,  Table 1). The pension is indexed to prices (from 2000,  to a mixture
of prices and wages),  rather than to subsequent changes  in demographic  projections or to
real wage bill  growth.  Moreover, increases  in 1997 and 1998  in fact exceeded  price inflation.
Although these features are the core of a programme based on notional accounts,
there are other pertinent features to  the Latvian  reform.  First there is a minimum social
assistance  pension as a 'safety net' after age 55 (women) and age 60 (men). Secondly,  there
are credits to the system for specified non-contributory periods including military service,
time spent in higher education,  periods of sickness  and unemployment,  child  care, and so on.
General tax revenues cover these and, presumably, other immediate transfers to  cover
existing  liabilities  under the old system.  It should be noted that the minimum pension, in
particular,  is substantial  relative  to the average  contributory pension. The minimum  pension
12  The current  (1999)  'social  tax rate'  is around  35  per cent,  although  it has  to be assumed  that  not all  of
this is to be attributed to the Notional Account for retirement provision, since existing  liabilities  and other
expenditures  such as disability  must also be covered.
13  This looks like  a simple application of actuarial tables but in fact it is straightforward  to show that
different assumptions as to future mortality,  indexation,  survivors'  benefits and so on generate  widely  differing
notional replacement  rates at retirement.
13is around 26 per cent of the average wage while the pension for a full career on average
earnings covers 40 per cent of pay.  Since  the eligibility  requirements for the minimum
pension are fairly lax, the marginal return, in terms of additional pension, from further
contributions  above  the minimum  is rather low, especially  for low earners.' 4
What happens if there are forecasting errors concerning life expectancy? Under the
Latvian  programme,  the G-value  is set for any cohort of retirees and this determines  the real
value of pension benefits  thereafter. Any unexpected  increase  in longevity,  for example,  has
to be covered from other government revenues,  rather than by any revision  in the value of
the 'points' or through the provision  of variable  annuities,  as in the Buchanan  scheme. Thus
there remains  substantial  potential  for intragenerational  redistribution  within  the scheme and
potential net fiscal  liabilities. These general issues are discussed further in later sections of
this paper.
There are also provisions  for the subsequent development  of a choice-based  funded
pillar, by which younger individuals  will have the option of transferring a fraction of their
contributions to  a fully funded scheme of individual  accounts. Legislation  was passed in
1998  to introduce a regulated  pillar of voluntary  retirement saving  and it is intended that this
framework  will be extended to the development  of a funded component to the mandatory
system (Fox and Palmer, 1999).
Sweden
The Swedish  pension reformn  was initially  proposed in 1994  but it was not until 1998
that the majority  of the required  legislation  was passed (Palner, 1999). Since  Latvia  appears
to have been the 'test bed' for the Swedish  reforrn, it is not surprising  to find many similar
features. Again, the social security  prograrn  will be composed of a means-tested  'guarantee
pension' and an 'income  pension' on top.  The latter takes  the form of a system of individual
notional accounts,  into which contributions  proportional to earnings  (between a floor and a
ceiling)  are paid,  totalling 18.5  per cent of payroll. Of the 18.5  per cent total, 2.5 percentage
points will  be invested in private funded accounts. The remaining  16 percentage  points will
14  The minimum  pension  is triggered  by ten years'  contributions  but cannot be received  until 55/60.
Nevertheless  a full contribution  history  for 40 years on average  earnings  will therefore  only  increase  the
replacement  rate  by 14  per cent. The  increase  for someone  with  an incomplete  contribution  record  or below
14continue to  finance pay-as-you-go  pensions.  These contributions will also be credited to
workers' notional accounts,  earning  them a pay-as-you-go  pension right. An imputed rate of
return will also be credited to  the account.  Again, there are provisions for  'imaginary'
contributions from the public budget for periods of economic  inactivity  during the lifetime:
for women bringing up young children, spells of unemployment, sickness and disability,
periods of military  conscription  and post-school education.
The imputed rate of return credited  to the pay-as-you-go  component of the notional
account pre-retirement  is indexed to average  earnings growth  The funded component will
of course earn the actual,  market rate of return. There is no reason why the returns on the
two components should coincide. On retirement, the unfunded component is converted to
an annuity  value using a formula,  taking account both of the age of retirement and also the
expected average length of life at retirement:  the 'G-value' again. A public agency (rather.
than a private annuity  provider) converts the funded component into an annuity separately,
but simultaneously.
Benefits in retirement are not simply price or earnings  indexed, as in 'traditional'
defined benefit social security programs and the Latvian example, but are indexed by a
formula  which takes account of any deviation  of real wage growth from a growth 'norm' (to
be set at 1.6 per cent)." 5 Given the earlier discussion,  these calculations  are designed to
adjust generational  rates of return to the underlying  sustainable  growth rate of the economy.
However, while demographic  and productivity shocks during the lifetime can be absorbed
by adjustments to the revaluation of contributions and by the calculation  of the 'G-value',
once annuitised  the scheme member is insured against demographic  shocks in the form of
changes in longevity. Tis  'risk' is borne by the public budget. Finally, the system will be
introduced gradually  but retrospectively,  such that individuals  born between 1938 and 1953
average  earnings  will  be smaller  or zero. Although  there  are currently  (dis)incentives  to early  (ate)  retirement  in
the Latvian  scheme,  they  do not seem  particularly  large,  especially  for low-income  earners.
15  Sunden  (1998)  provides  an example.  Suppose  inflation  is 2 per cent p.a.,  and actual  real  wage  growth
is 0.5 per cent p.a  Then actual  indexation  is (2 - (1.6  - 0.5)) = 0.9%  p.a.  Of course  were the longevity
adjustment  to be incorporated  to pensions  in payment  as well as at retirement  (as  was apparently  originally
proposed),  then the evolution  of the pension  will  be determined  by the indexation  formula  and the longevity
improvement,  ie.,  P, = [Pt_I(1  +  7c,_i +  wt.,  - w*)]/(l+AGt,)  where  P is the  pension,  7i is the  rate  of price
inflation,  w and w* are the actual and 'norm' rates of earnings growth and AG is the effect of any longevity
improvement  on the 'G-value'.
15obtain  increasing  proportions  of their retirement  income  from  the new  system  by  year,  with
cohorts  born  after  1953  fully  participating  in the new  scheme." 6
Poland
Radical  pension  reform  was first proposed  by the government  in 1995;  the current
legislation  was implemented  in 1999  (Chlon  et  aL, 1999).  Under the existing  (pre-reform)
scheme,  employers  paid 45 per cent of wage  bill (plus  a subsidy  of approximately  1.5 per
cent of GDP from general  revenues)  to finance  retirement,  disability  and other benefits.
The reformed  scheme  again  has a multipillar  aspect,  with  a mandatory  unfunded  component,
and smaller  mandatory  and voluntary  funded  components. However,  despite  the smaller
contribution  to the funded  part, the government  expects  in the long run that the average
pensioner  will  derive  half  their  income  from  this source  because  of the higher  return.
The key proposal  is to reconstitute  the existing  unfunded  defined  benefit  plan as a
notional  account  scheme,  supplemented  by a component  that will be paid into a funded
account. Since  there is also a reallocation  of contributions,  with part of the notional
incidence  now  being  borne  by the employee,  a comparison  with the existing  scheme  is not
straightforward.  Under  the new scheme  12 percentage  points of the combined  payroll  tax
rate  will be diverted  to an individual's  notional  account,  7 percentage  points to the second
tier funded  account,  and  the remaining  21  percentage  points  used  for other  benefits  (such  as
disability  benefits).  Participation  in the funded  pillar  is compulsory  for those  aged  below  30
in 1999  and  voluntary  for those  between  ages  30 and 50. The alternative  to participation  in
the funded  pillar  is a revised  transitional  benefit  from  the unfunded  scheme.  In the medium
term,  it is assumed  that  the exceptionally  high  payroll  tax rate  can  be cut back  significantly  by
switching  to a notional  account  basis  plus  some  pre-funding.  However  it should  be borne  in
mind  that a part of contribution  revenue  will  be diverted  to funded  accounts  (depending  on
the degree  of switching),  so that  the remaining  contributions  have  to finance  existing  public
obligations.  Although  in due course  this cost may  be offset  by the implicit  reduction  in the
value of  existing  accumulated  rights (largely  by elininating early retirement)  and by
16  Previously,  benefit  entitlements  were  calculated  on the  basis  of a subset  of 'best  years'  earnings:  for
further  details,  see  Palrne  and  Svensson  (1997).
16incomplete  indexation  of notional  accounts  to real  wage  growth,  substantial  switching  will
require  budgetary  support  from other  sources  of revenue." 7
As in Latvia and Sweden,  the notional  account  structure  works by accumulating
contributions  in a 'virtual  capital  account'. In Poland,  the sum in the account  will be
revalued  in line  with only  75 per cent  of wage  bill growth. For those  already  working  under
the previous  pension  regime,  accrued  'rights'  are incorporated  as notional  'initial  capital'  in
the national  accounts,  rather than by issuing  separate  'recognition  bonds' as in Chile or
providing  transitional  defined  benefit  pensions  as in other reformed  systems.  The value  of
this 'initial  capital'  will  be determined  by the value  of accrued  rights  obtained  under  the old
system but  assuming  that everyone  retires at  age 62, with some further transition
arrangements  for earlier  cohorts  of women  who would  have  retired  earlier  (see  Chlon  et aL,
1999,  p.20ft). Each  participant  will  receive  regular  information  on the value  of these  'virtual
capital  accounts'  and an estimate  of their prospective  annuity  value  on different  assumptions
concerning  retirement  age  and  assumed  prospective  longevity.
There is a minimum  pension  age of 60 for women and 65 for men (a common
retirement  age having  previously  been proposed: see Gora and Rutkowski,  1998),  with
explicit  increases  in pension  benefits  attached  to later  retirement  (in  addition,  presumably,  to
the revaluation  of existing  'virtual  capital). As in the other countries,  the annuity  formula
will  take account  of life expectancy  at the time of retirement,  rather than on a composite
wage-related  formula,  as in a typical  defined  benefit  plan. Pension  benefits  in payment  will
be indexed  to price inflation,  although  procedures  can vary if nominal  wage  growth  falls
below  price  inflation  or where  fiscal  performance  is particularly  good  (G6ra  and Rutkowski,
ibid,  p.15). There are also provisions  for a guaranteed  minimum  pension  financed  from
other  tax revenues,  for a contribution  ceiling  and for contribution  reductions  for employers
that offer an additional  contribution  to third pillar  voluntary  retirement  saving  accounts.
Additional  credits  to notional  accounts  are offered  for periods  of unemployment,  and care
of children  or the disabled.  Finally,  any  surplus  accrued  by the system,  and a mandatory  1
per cent of the total payroll  tax, will be accumulated  in a separate  'demographic  reserve
17  Chlon et  a. (1999)  estimate,  that if all individuals  between 30 and 50 switch,  a deficit of around 1 per
cent of GDP will  need to be covered  from privatisation  receipts and debt finance by the year 2014. Note from
the comparable  evidence  provided in Palacios  and Whitehouse (1998),  Disney, Palacios  and Whitehouse (1999)
and World Bank (1999),  that a high degree  of voluntary switching  seems likely.
17fund',  to offset  any  prospective  rise  in contribution  rates  arising  from demographic  ageing  in
the future.
Notional accounts schemes in theory  andpractice
It is apparent  from the above  discussion  that there are some common  features  to
'notional  account'  reforms. First,  they  usually  attempt  to reduce  the degree  of variation  in
implicit  returns  to pension  contributions  across  members  of the same  generation.  Secondly,
by linking  pension  values  at retirement  to expected  longevity,  they intend to reduce  the
degree  of variation  in returns  aoss  generations.  But there are also substantial  differences.
First,  in indexation  or revaluation  procedures,  both before  and after  retirement.  Secondly,  in
transition  strategies  and, thirdly,  in the accumulation  of 'discretionary'  credits  to notional
accounts  that are unrelated  to contributions  (sometimes  called  imaginary  contributions).  In
what follows,  therefore,  the focus  is on a 'generic'  notional  account-type  reform,  although
the relation  between  principles  and country  practice  will  be highlighted  on occasions.
3.  'Actuarial  fairness'  and  insurance  features  of the new  scheme
Fairness  in pension  programmes:  intragenerational  outcomes
As suggested  in the introduction,  advocates  make  a number  of claims  for notional
accounts.  For example,  Palmer  (1999)  argues  that 'a fundamental  feature  of the NDC [i.e,
Notional  Accounts  Defined  Contribution  pay-as-you-go  system]  is that it isfa'  (op.  & p.8).
Of course, notional  accounts  cannot be absolutely ac iZI  fair because  they do not
automatically  generate  the market rate of return on contributions  (Hassler  and Lindbeck,
1996).  Nor are  individuals  in the scheme  risk-rated  (over  systematic  differences  in mortality,
for example).  The concept  of 'fairness'  in this context  is somewhat  different,  illustrated  in
Palmer's  paper  by  two individuals  of the same  cohort  entering  the notional  accounts  scheme
at different  stages  of the life cycle.  The contribution-based  feature  of the scheme,  together
with  the particular  revaluation  procedure,  then ensure  that the pension  benefits  of the two
individuals  are proportional  to the amount of time in and how much that they have
18contributed to the scheme.'" In the terminology  of Hassler and Lindbeck (1996),  this makes
the scheme 'fairer' on  thema?on relative  to other pay-as-you-go  pension schemes.
To show this, write a basic version of the benefit accrual formula under notional
accounts as:
R
p = gyWI(IR  l  I,)c  (1)
t=o
where p is the pension value; g is the pre-set conversion factor (related  to the 'G-value) by
which the notional capital is converted into a pension stream; w, is  the wage at t; I is the
appropriate revaluation  index (such as the wage bill); and c is the contribution rate.  So the
value of the pension is a product of three variables  set by the government: c, g arrl  I set by
the  government.  The  revaluation procedure  ensures  that  the  magial  return  on
contributions in terms of increased pension is invariant  to timing.  Hence, the pension is
proportional to  contributions (discounted by the revaluation factor, e.g wage bill growth,
which is unlikely  to coincide  with any conventional  discount  rate). This is the sense in which
Palmer uses  the concept of 'fairness'  to describe  the scheme.
By way of comparison, we can write down the accrual formula for a benchmark
unfunded defined benefit plan in which benefits are calculated on a measure of average
revalued  earnings. This would give:
R
p =  aw,  (IR /II)  (2)
t=0
There are two broad differences between (1) and (2).  First, the revaluation factors may
differ between the schemes: for example,  many defined benefit plans use earnings growth
rather than real wage bill growth.  And they are also often based on  sub-set of lifetime
earnings. Two-thirds of developing countries and 40 per cent of OECD pension systems
are based on 'final' pay, ranging  from the last month's to the last ten years'. Another fifth of
18  Proportionality  of contributions  and  benefits  only  holds  if the  discount  rate  applied  to contributions
at different  times  is the same  as the notional  return.  Using  the (higher)  market  rate  of return  would  give  a
higher  weight  to early  years'  contributions.
19countries  base pensions  on a limited  number of 'best' years" 9. It is, however,  in principle
straightforward  to  adjust the defined benefit pension formula to provide a revaluation
procedure  comparable  to a notional  accounts  scheme. 20
The second,  more substantive,  difference  lies in the substitution  of a, the accrual
rate,  with  gxc. The accrual  rate is usually  deterrnmined  by some  political  process  on the basis
of a target  level of generosity  of plan benefits. It can vary across  time: for example,  50
countries  vary  the accrual  rate  so  that the first  years'  contributions  (typically  the first 10  or 20
years')  earn  more  pension  than subsequent  contributions.  It can also  differ  according  to the
level  of earnings  (as  in the pre-1992  Italian  system  and the US social  security  programme).
Given  a target  level  of the pension,  the contribution  rate can be 'solved'  to generate  pay-as-
you-go  equilibrium,  where  contribution  revenues  and benefit  payments  are equalised  at each
point  in time. (Otherwise  there  will  be pay-as-you-go  deficits  or surpluses  that might  require
support  from other  sources  of taxation.)  Thus  the contribution  rate  does  not appear  directly
in the benefit  formula  in (2).
Under  what circumstances  do notional  accounts  and a defined  benefit  plan generate
the same  outcome? Clearly,  if accrual  rates  vary  over the lifetime  or across  earnings,  there
will  be divergences  between  the plans. Differences  can also  result  if the measure  of earnings
on which the defined benefit pension is based does not fully incorporate  full lifetime
earnings,  or if there are ceilings,  floors  and minimum  eligibility  periods. Of course  many  of
these  are  also  found  in notional  accounts  systems,  as  the discussion  of individual  countries  in
the previous  section  made clear. But a 'pure' defined  benefit  plan in which  pensions  are
based cy on revalued  lifetime  earnings  satisfies  exactly  the same  'within  generation'  critenron
for fairness  as 'pure' notional accounts. The difference  is that, in a notional defined
contribution  account,  the accrual  rate is expressed  as a notional  interest  rate and tied  to the
real  productivity  growth  of the economy  during  the working  lifetime  rather than by some
political  process  underlying  a target  replacement  rate. 2"  If this is the only gerri difference
between  the two schemes,  then it is the iztergenerational  incidence  of the progranmme  that is
19  Disney and Whitehouse, 1999,  Tables 1 and 2.
20  This may, of course, be politically  difficult,  given that there are likely  to be clear losers from such a
reform, but there is no guarantee that a switch to a notional accounts basis will prove any more politically
tractable  if it generates  an identical  outcome.
21  In fact, even this is not true in Poland, since  the notional accounts  will  be revalued  at a rate of only 75
per cent of real wage  bill growth.
20affected  by the accrual  rate,  not its itragenerational  (within  generation)  incidence.  In which
case,  the primar-y  difference  between  a 'parametrically'  reform  defined  benefit  plan and a
notional  account  scheme  lies in how  well,  and in what way,  the marginal  accrual/notional
interest  rate  distinction  is understood  by members  of the scheme.  Any  differential  impact  of
a standard  'parametric'  reform  and a 'notional  account'  scheme,  or differences  in political
feasibility,  then arise merely because  this equivalence  is not well understood,  at least
initially. 22
Fairness  in pension programmes:  intergenerational  outcomes
What  of the use of the term 'fairness'  in the treatment  of different  generations,  z.  e, in
the intergenerational  sense? Samuelson  (1958)  postulated  that a 'fair'  social  contract  between
generations  could  in principle  exist  in the context  of a 'consumption  loan economy'. Such
an economy  had no storage  possibilities  (or storage  costs, implying  a negative  return on a
'funded'  scheme).  By agreeing  to a scheme  of within-period  transfers  between  generations,
each generation  could  potentially  'eam' a return equivalent  to the rate of growth of the
labour  force. Aaron  (1966)  extended  this line  of reasoning  to point  out that potential  return
on an unfunded  transfer  scheme  could  be the sum  of labour  force  and  productivity  growth.
It should  be noted  that this  is not the only  criterion  of 'fairness'  that could  be applied
in intergenerational  comparisons. For example,  it is nct compatible  with the utilitarian
perspective,  in which  the marginal  utility  of consumption  is equated  across  generations  - see
Samuelson's  debate  with Lerner  in 1959.  Nor is it compatible  with a purely  within-period
redistributive  framework  in  which the  marginal utility of  money is  equated across
heterogeneous  households. 2'  Nevertheless,  Samuelson's  point was that this was the return
that would  be compatible  with the optimal  consumption  allocation  across  periods  for each
representative-agent  generation. 24 Of course,  in the real  world,  there are durable  goods  and
22  As one Swedish  expert explained,  "A consequence  of the political  strategy  chosen  is that....the
changes  necessary  to make  the system  financially  sustainable  are 'concealed',...  A downside  of the approach
described  here  is that  the 'losers" only  gradually  realize  what has  happened.."  See  Scherman  (1999).
23  A point  recognised  in all  the notional  accounts  reforms  by maintaining  various  redistributive  features
such as differential  retirement  ages  for men and women,  various  forms of credits  for non-participants,  and
minimum  pensions  or social  assistance  schemes.
24  That is,  which  would  equate  (discounted)  marginal  utility  across  time  periods  by any  generation.  With
uncertainty  added,  this becomes  the Euler  equation  underlying  life  cycle  optimal  consumption  allocations.  This
21individuals  can 'invest' in claims on future income flows from owned assets. If the returns
on these claims (approximately  derived  from the marginal  product of capital  in the long run)
exceeded  the underlying  rate of productivity  growth per head,  then a saving  (funded)  strategy
would be superior to the unfunded 'consumption loan' model.  In this standard case of
dynamic efficiency,  any concept of 'faimess' in the long run would surely suggest  adopting
the funded strategy:  the real question  would become one of sharing  the transition burden of
moving  from an existing  unfunded scheme  to a funded scheme  across generations.
A further major concern in Samuelson (1958) was whether any means could be
found of implementing  'intergenerational  social  contracts' of this type in the absence  of real
claims (storable goods in his framework). This is the problem of commitment,  which has
resurfaced in many areas of economics, here arising because future generations cannot be
committed to any institutional arrangements  agreed by current, living, generations. Only if
there are design features  that make reneging on pre-commitments  costly (for example,  costs
to changing institutions, or the possibility of punishment strategies)  can contracts of this
type be enforceable,  and it is hard to think of plausible mechanisms with unfunded social
security. 25
All this of course sounds rather abstract in the context of social security  in the real
world, and notional accounts in particular,  but it is in fact highly  pertinent. First, because it
provides some logical  basis on which to talk about 'fairness' and, secondly,  because  the pre-
commitment  problem seems very relevant  to schemes based on notional accounts. The key
parameters in a notional accounts  reform that impinge on intergenerational  fairness are the
conversion factor relating notional capital and  the  annuity value of  the  pension  (the
'G-value') and  post-retirement indexation of  benefits.  These  are  essentially political
decisions, not  governed by the design mechanisms that  are designed to  lock'  notional
accounts  participants  into an 'actuarially  fair' scheme.
In the first case, it is easy to demonstrate that  'G-values' are highly sensitive to
assumptions  concerning expected  mortality and rates of return and offer plenty of scope for
governments to  'cheat' on  particular generations."  In  the  second case, any notional
is an 'optirnal'  allocation  from the point of view of the consumer,  which  was Samuelson's  point, but not
necessarily  a socially  'fair'  allocation  without  further  analysis  of what constitutes  'fairness'.
25  See  Estaban  and SAkovics  (1993).  For further  discussion  and  references,  see  Disney  (1996)  Chapter  9.
26  For an illustration  in  the case  of Poland,  see  Whitehouse  (1997),  Table  1  and  the discussion  thereof.
22revaluation  of contributions  and post-retirement  indexation  of benefits according  to  a
formula that takes account of changes  in productivity  and longevity  is unlikely  to  be
transparent  to benefit  recipients.  So  it would  be highly  susceptible  to political  pressures,  not
least because  procedures  governing  the indexation  of benefits  in retirement  are among  the
most intrinsically  overt components  of the social  security system. 27 In particular,  any
program  that seriously  proposed  to under-index  pensions  to price inflation  (by applying
some  formula  of the type described  in footnote 14 on Sweden  above)  is likely  to run into
stiff opposition  from recipients  and  workers  alike.  At the same  time,  with a separate  funded
component  that is presumably  earning  the average  rate of return in the capital  market,
workers  would be likely  to press for the unfunded  component  also to earn that return.
Consequently,  it  is hard to  believe  that applications  of  abstract formulae to  benefit
indexation  decisions  can be sustained,  whatever  the concept  of 'fairness'  which  provides  the
underlying  rationale.
There is a further  point.  The early  growth  and overlapping  generation  models  that
underpinned  these  models  of 'optimal'  pay-as-you-go  financing  of social  security  have  been
supplemented  by, if not superseded  by, the endogenous  growth  literature.  The main  feature
of the literature  is, in essence,  that productivity  growth is not exogenously  determined.
Instead,  it depends  on the value  of investment  in physical  and human capital. Increased
investment,  as a consequence,  for example,  of funding social security,  may raise the
productivity  of capital  such  that  the decline  in the marginal  product  of capital  (rate  of return)
associated  with capital  deepening  is largely  offset.  In simnilar  vein, investment  in hunwz
capital  (education  and training)  should  ultimately  raise  the productivity  growth  rate of the
economy. In an overlapping  generations  context,  it is possible  to think of each generation
facing  a choice  between  maintaining  an existing  unfunded social  security  program  or of
investing  in raising  the long run growth  potential  of the economy. With an economy's
productivity  growth in  effect endogenous  to  the  method chosen to  finance pension
obligations,  any social security  'arithmetic'  based on identifying  an exogenous  rate of
productivity  growth  in determining  the accrual  of pension  liabilities  is an irrelevance.
27  For example,  as mentioned above, in 1997 and 1998,  in the face of an election  and improved public
finances, pensioners in Latvia were given real increases  in pension, despite the law providing for only price
indexation.  Poland, too,  has uprated pensions more slowly or  quickly than the  formula in the light of
developments  in the public finances.
23This  section  has  therefore  given  some  analytical basis to  the  concept  of
intergenerational 'fairness'.  While it  is undoubtedly true that  existing social security
programs have benefited  early  generations  disproportonately,  the idea of linking  the 'return'
to subsequent generations  to some real productivity  growth condition is problematic for at
least three reasons.  First, unless there is  dynamic inefficiency,  then  by forgoing the
opportunity of obtaining  the marginal  product of capital (rate of return) through funding,
the economy is incurring a first order welfare loss.  Secondly,  there are no credible pre-
comrnitment mechanisms in  unfunded social security- the  key parameters in  notional
accounts that are held to ensure intergenerational  equity are in fact far from transparent and
are subject  to political manipulation. And third, in a dynamic  economy, almost all the key
indicators of  'sustainability'  to  which the  returns  on  notional  accounts are tied  are
endogenously  determined. Higher investment  (saving)  in physical  and human capital,  which
may be associated  with funding  in equilibrium,  may in fact change the underlying  potential
growth rate of the economy,  which was held to be the 'constant' underlying  the formula
underpinning  pension determination  in the unfunded system.
Is there an insurance argument for unfunded indizidual accounts?
Although dynamic efficiency might suggest that  a system of  funded individual
accounts is superior on expected  rate of return grounds, some have argued  that there is an
insurance motive for combinations of funded and unfunded individual accounts.  Such
schemes,  it is argued, contain superior portfolio diversification  properties to schemes  that
are wholly funded (this underpins  the title of the Polish reform proposals). The implication
is that  risk-averse individuals might wish to  have a  pension scheme containing both
components.
The rationale for a diversification  strategy governing individual  accounts rests on
assumptions  concerning  porfolio  nsk.  From an individual  perspective,  a mix of funded and
unfunded pension provision will increase welfare if the risk reduction property of the
balanced  portfolio outweighs  the loss of return from sacrificing  dynamic efficiency  by not
choosing a whoLly  funded scheme. However, this case for mixed financing  does not dqpend
on the relative  magnitudes  of the variances  of individual  returns in the portfolio. The fact
that investment  returns in a funded scheme may be volatile  pr  se  is irrelevant. Instead, the
24key issue is the couria  of investment  retums  in the defined  contribution  plan and the
implicit  'return'  in a defined  benefit  plan (ie.,  in an approximately  actuarially  fair plan,  the
rate  of growth  of the wage  bill). Negative  covariance  is ideal  for a diversification  argument;
but positive  covariance  reduces  the gain  from diversifying  across  pension  schemes. On
intuitive  grounds,  positive  covariance  seems  the more  plausible  outcome  if, in the short run,
profit share  and productivity  growth  are both pro-cyclical,  while  in the long run, a falling
marginal  product  of capital  is associated  with  declining  labour  force  growth.  Ultimately,  this
is an empirical  issue. Palacios  (1998)  finds  little  evidence  in various  countries  over  time of
covariance  between  equity  returns  and  productivity  growth.
A more fundamental  issue,  however,  is whether  there is some financial  asset,  the
return on which  is perfectly  covarying  with the implicit  return  in an unfunded  scheme,  such
as a bond  yielding  the riskless  rate  of interest.  If this is the case,  then  there is no need  for a
residual  unfunded  component  to income  replacement  irrespective  of covariance  structure.
Indeed  the original  Buchanan  (1968)  proposal  suggested  mandatory  purchases  of a social
security  bond  indexed  to real  wage  growth.  A superior  insurance  strategy  would  surely  be to
fund the social  security  system  but for the government  to provide  bonds indexed  to real
wage  bill growth. People  who felt that they could  obtain superior  insurance  against  the
volatility  of  investment returns could buy these bonds.  Given this  solution, the
'diversification'  argument  for maintaining  an unfunded  component  to individual  accounts
seems  to have  litte rationale.
4.  Macroeconomic  aspects  of notional  accounts
Fiscal  sustainability
Another  key argument  for notional  accounts,  in the eyes  of advocates,  is that they
assist  in realising  fiscal  sustainability.  For example,  Palmer  (1999)  writes:
"A goal of the  Swedish  reform is to  create lcnr  n  [m,y  Italics]  financial
sustainability,  even in the  face of  extremely  adverse  demographic  and/or
economic  developments.  Financial  stability  in its strictest  interpretation  means
that the contribution  rate can remain  fixed [again,  my italics]  over all coming
generations...  Consequently  there  will  no longer  be a need  - or an excuse  - for
politicians  to intervene  for financial  reasons"  (zM, p.5)
There  are  a number  of issues  here,  which  can  be brought  out by a comparison  with  the two
other reforms mentioned in the  introduction.  First, a  parametric  reform achieves
25sustainability by  changing the  scheme's generosity or,  if  that  fails, by  changing the
contribution rate in the long run. In contrast, a fully-funded  scheme avoids the problem of
financial  sustainability  in the face of shocks by ensuring  that there are assets  to match exactly
the liabilities  at each point in time, with demographic  shocks (e.g.,  changes in the average
length of life)  borne by the insurer.
In a notional account svstem,  the independence  of the scheme's  commitments  from
shocks is, it is argued, brought about by the formula-driven  adjustments  to benefits which
permit  the  scheme to  replicate the  internal rate  of  return  consistent with  financial
sustainability.  For example,  an adverse  demographic  or productivity  shock  leads  to revisions
to the prospective  annuity,  via the revaluation  procedure  and the application  of the 'G-value'
to calculate  the annuity at retirement,  such as to ensure internal equilibrium. However, for
this requirement  to hold strictly,  contributions must be revalued in line with the growth of
the contributions base, and post-retirement,  the 'G-value' must be altered continuously  in
Line  with prospective  changes  in longevity  and the contribution  base.
Among the countries  that have  implemented  the reform, only  Latvia  appears  to have
adhered strictly  to the first requirement. Indexing contributions  to rezd  eags  gnmth is not
sufficient,  if, for examnple,  there is a fall in the size of the labour force (due, say, to past
falling  birth rates). This leads  Hamann (1997),  in his discussion  of the 'Dini' reform in Italy,
to argue:
"Whereas  an actuarially  fair  pay-as-you-go  system  would exhibit a balanced  cash
flow with a constant population growth rate, it would stiU  run deficits  during a
demographic  transition. Therefore  the Dini system  is not explicitly  equipped  to
deal with one of the most pressing  issues of Italy's public finances  over the next
four or five decades: a significant  deterioration in elderly dependency ratios"
ibiX,  p.2 1.
An additional  problem in Italy, as mentioned previously,  is that each individual  is
credited  with the contribution that would approximately  sustain fiscal balance  although the
actual  contribution  levied is less than that.  This means that the scheme  is already  explicitly
in deficit  relative  to pay-as-you-go  balance.
Turning  to the second issue  - the adjustment  of the annuity in line with subsequent
revisions  of forecasts  concerning  longevity  and productivity  growth  - none of the reforms
appear  to deal with this problem. This is a serious  onission, because  individuals  retiring at,
26say, 60 can expect to live for perhaps 25 more years on average,  and 25 year periods have
seen substantial  upward revisions in life expectancy. For example,  in the United Kingdom,
the official  projection of the number of retirement pensioners in the year 2025 has increased
by around 40 per cent in a period of twenty  years from 1975  to  1995. The construction of
confidence  intervals  around population projections for the United States by Lee and Skinner
(1999)  illustrates  the point.  Furthermore, all the forecasting errors that occur seem to have
been one-sided - overstating retirement age and understating length of life.  If no ex post
adjustment  to the actuarial  formula is made, the costs will be borne by rising public deficits
or rising contribution rates. Thus the scheme will have to resort to  'parametric'  reforms to
restore financial  sustainability.
In contrast, how does the private market deal with unexpected increases  in longevity?
Although the recent experience with fixed rate annuity contracts in the United Kingdom
suggests that private markets may also have difficulty in forecasting longevity, there are
adjustment  mechanisms  in the private sector.  One is a reinsurance market. The second is
that  insurance companies may also provide life insurance, which  may have portfolio
insurance  properties  when there are unanticipated  increases  in longevity.
Notional accounts systems  may not automatically  absorb long run demographic  and
productivity shocks without changes in the contribution rate Gust like a defined benefit
scheme). But they might have better short run properties than traditional defined benefit
schemes that lack explicit stabilising mechanisms.  Some analysts who are nevertheless
critical of the long-run stability  properties  - such as Hamann (1997)  - largely  accept  this
argument.  Others are less convinced.  Valdes-Prieto (1999) argues that it is only under
extremely  restrictive  conditions  - basically,  constant demographics  and productivity  growth
- that fiscal stability  can be continuously  maintained by a 'pure' notional accounts system.
The reason is intuitive: such a scheme attempts to  'mimic' a funded plan by accumulating
notional capital  over time that is then revalued by some parameter designed  to approximate
the evolution  of fiscal sustainability  over time. But this scheme constitutes neither a funded
equilibrium,  nor a pay-as-you-go  equilibrium  in which commitments must equal revenues  at
each  point in time (m which case, past history is irrelevant).  In this  sense, he  argues, a
'traditional' pay-as-you-go scheme is more  transparent  because outgoings must  equal
revenues  in each period. So, it is soon apparent that sustained  deficits  must be eliminated  by
27benefit  cuts  or contribution  rate  rises.  If the  built-in  stabilisers in  the  notional  accounts
scheme  (the  revaluation  procedure  and  the  'G-value')  do  not  'work',  in  the  sense  of
maintaining fiscal balance, then  the scheme  does not have  direct recourse  to  the standard
ways of restoring  pay-as-you-go equilibrium.  Any  effective solution  would  question  the
credibility of  the  whole  notional  accounts  scheme.  I  return  to  the  issue  of  credibility
shordy.28
Notional  account  schemes  rely on  the  relative  constancy  of  the  parameters  that
underlie  the revaluation  factor and  the calculation of the  'G-value'.  A  natural  question is
how  stable are these factors in practice?  I abstract  from demographic  shocks, which have
been  discussed previously.  Figure 1 shows real wage bill growth for Sweden for 1973-1998
and for Latvia and Poland for the shorter periods during which adequate statistics have been
collected.  (The  charts  have  the  same scale.)  Since it  is implicit that  the  revaluation is
undertaken  year  by  year,  these  annual  changes  should  approximate  those  that  were
implemented  in these  countries had their notional  account schemes been in place over the
period.
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Figure  1. Real  wage bill  growth  in countries  with  notional  accounts
Sweden  Latvia  and Poland
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Source:  OECD  Economic  Surveys  of Sweden,  various  years  and  IMF  Financial  Statistics
28  Hassler and Lindbeck  (1997) take a slighdy different line of argumentr  They argue that an 'actuarially
fair' pay-as-you-go  scheme is only  viable (with  constant growth and constant rate of return) if there is dynamic
ineffieng.  They also  show  that,  when  a balanced  budget  is  assumed,  a variety  of  types  of  pay-as-you-go
schemes can generate their version of 'actuarial fairness'.
29  As mentioned  earlier, Poland only revalues to a constant  fraction of real earnings growth.
28For  Sweden, wage bill growth averaged around  1.4 per  cent over a 25 period,
approximately  the same as the 1.6 per cent growth norm used in official  calculations. There
are periods with a sequence of years below the average and at least one year, 1975,  with a
dramatic positive residual.  However, the chart suggests that trend and volatility do not
appear to be major issues in Sweden. Contrast this result with Latvia  and Poland, which are
not untypical  examples of transition economies. There has been immense volatility  in real
wage bill growth in both countries in the recent past.  For what it is worth, the average
annual  wage bill growth in Poland barely exceeds  zero while in Latvia  it is above 4 per cent.
But it would be foolish to invest much trust in either of these as a long-run measure given
apparently negative labour force growth in  both  countries in  most  recent years.  So
specifying  a norm  for wage bill growth to  use in  notional accounts calculations is very
difficult.
Faced with this volatility  and the absence  of a meaningful  average  (long-run) growth
of the real wage bill, one option would be to chose to credit notional accounts each  year with
the ai,wZ  actual rate of real wage bill growth.  But then workers would be exposed to a
good  deal of  uncertainty, probably just  as much  as  investment returns.  So linking
revaluation  to  a volatile series provides no more insurance than would be provided in a
funded scheme.
One possible feedback mechanism is for the scheme to  smooth out  short-term
fluctuations in wage bill growth by establishing  a small accumulated fund.  Higher than
expected  wage bill growth will lead to prospective faster revaluation  of benefits but it also
permits a faster growth of revenues. A partial  fund can be used to dampen fluctuations  in
real wage bill growth, but this requires  incomplete linking of annuity values  and revaluation
to the real wage bill (as in the case of Poland). The risk of such a strategy,  however,  is that
the pension authority confuses the cycle and trend.  If a trend change in growth occurs,
while the government perceives this change as fluctuations around an underlying  constant
rate of growth, the system will soon generate  cumulative surpluses or deficits.  Again this
casts doubt on the  rationale for such a  scheme that it avoids any impact of changing
demographics  and productivity  on fiscal  sustainability
29Credibility  in notional  account  pension schemes
A feature of notional accounts,  it  is claimed,  is that they give  people explicit
'property  rights', in the form of individualised  claims  on  future tax revenues. This
troupavxy of notional  accounts  schemes  is more illusory  than real,  however,  without  any
fund to back  those  claims. 30 There is much scope  for argument  as to whether  such claims
are likely  to be perceived  as any more 'real' than prospective  benefits  in pay-as-you-go
defined  benefit  schemes. In the latter,  individuals  are given  a generalised  commitment  to
replacement  of earnings;  in the former,  people  are given  an individualised  daim to a fund
with  an annuity  that  will  be unknown  until  after  conversion.  Both  are subject  to uncertainty
and  the risk  of effective  tax  rises  and/or benefit  cuts. When  the government,  rather  than  the
insurance  company,  acts as the guarantor,  the issue  of government  credibility  is a central
question.  Scherman  (1999)  makes  this  point from  the Swedish  perspective:
"The fact that pension  rights are credited  to individual  accounts  does not
introduce  a new element.  In the old system  all  such rights  were  maintained  in
individual  records,  this  was  seen  to guarantee  the benefit  'promises'  in the 1950s
and 1960s,  when  the system  was  introduced.  Time  has shown  that  such  types  of
promises  can  be changed  when  political  preferences  change  or financial  realities
require  modifications.  The same  can  happen  in the new  system."
There  is a parallel  here  with  the  issue  of credibility  in macroeconomics.  Policies  such
as central  bank independence  are designed  to avoid  the necessary  conflict  between  what is
expedient  for the government  in the short  run - for example,  stimulating  output  above  the
equilibrium  level  through  money  supply  increases  - and  what is a consistent  policy  in the
long run - keeping  output at its equilibrium  level. Such models  rely on asymmetric
information  between  the government  and 'the public',  on the govenment  and the 'public'
having  different  preferences,  and on the public  anticipating  that the governnent  will  renege
on its promises. In the face of these features,  central  bank independence  'gives'  the
government  credibility  and  thus allows  it to achieve  its goal  of stabilising  the price  level.
The parallel  in the context  of unfunded  public  pension  schemes  might be that, by
introducing  'rules'  (in particular,  a pre-set  procedure  for determining  pension  benefits  that
can be observed  continuously  by the public),  the scope  for short  term variations  in pension
3C  In  fact, as Scherman (1999) points  out, in Sweden "The  reality of  the  new Swedish system is  that
contributions,  as the law is formulated, are set independently  of pension entitlements  just  as in every PAYG
defined benefit scheme...  This law as such does not prevent an increase  (or decrease)  in contributions  without
affecting  pension rights."
30generosity  (for  example  raising  benefits,  lowering  retirement  age)  is precluded.  This,  it might
be argued,  permits  long term planning  of pension schemes  in the face of demographic
change rather than ad hoc adjustments,  frequently  blocked by interest groups and by
politicians  courting  short run popularity.  It takes  the 'insurance'  aspect  of the scheme  out of
the hands  of politicians  (see  the earlier  quote  from Palmer,  1999).
Even if we assume  that the mechanisms  implemented  with a notional  accounts
reform  do achieve  this goal,  and are  perceived  as credible  by the public,  on which  there are
some grounds  for scepticism  based on past experience, 31 there are nevertheless  intrinsic
problems  in the strategy. The first is that it fails  to address  the fundamental  issue  that
unfunded pension schemes are intrinsically  intergenerational  transfer mechanisms  that
involve resource redistribution. Declining  fertility,  the retirement  of the  'baby boom
generation',  and changes  in underlying  productivity  growth  all involve  possibly  disparate
burdens  across  generations  that have  to be addressed  in the political  arena. They  cannot
simply  be finessed  away  by applying  complex  revaluation  procedures  and rules concerning
annuitisation.  Transparency  means  that policy-makers  have  to be open to the public  as to
what is feasible  and what is not.  All notional  accounts  reforms  have been introduced  as
compromises  to placate  interest  groups  that were reluctant  to accept  that the generosity  of
existing  defined benefit  plans was no  longer feasible. I am not suggesting  that those
involved  in this type of reform  were unaware  of this point (mdeed  it is explicit  in all the
sources  cited here concerning  individual  countries),  merely  that compromises  cannot be
dressed  up as  principles.
Secondly,  there is a major danger in locking  the public finances  into individual
commitments  where  there  is neither  the financial  capital  (funding)  nor the political  capital  to
guarantee  that the promised  benefits  will eventually  be paid.  Whatever  the uncertainty
governing  investment  returns in funded schemes,  this is the basic difference  between  a
funded and an unfunded scheme.  If the  financial  sustainability  of notional accounts
programmes  cannot be guaranteed  (as suggested  in  the previous section, and more
emphatically  by Valdes-Prieto,  1999)  then the government  is faced with a stark choice.
Either it has to carry  potential  deficits  elsewhere  in the budget,  or else it has to adjust  the
parameters  of the notional  accounts  programme  ex  post,  so reducing  the explicit  value  of its
31individual  prormises  and darnaging,  perhaps  fatally,  the credibility  of the whole  scheme. The
lesson  from the macroeconomic  literature  is that government  policy  credibility  is hard won
but can  easily  be lost.
5.  Microeconomic  aspects  of notional  accounts
A further  argument  concerning  notional  accounts  is their impact  on incentives  to
retire  and more  generally  to participate  in paid  work at any age. There is an uncontentious
argument  that many  existing  unfunded  schemes  permit  individuals  to retire  too early,  while
there is no such  incentive  with 'pure' notional  accounts. Furthermore,  notional  accounts
adjust  benefit  formulae  to take  account  of rises  in longevity.  Of course,  'parametric'  reforms
to unfunded  schemes  can achieve  the same effect  by, in the short run, simply  by raising
retirement  age  and,  in the long  run, by  linking  retirement  age  explicitly  to expected  longevity.
Alternatively,  the pension  replacement  rate  can be adjusted  with  increases  in life  expectancy,
as  in the recent  reforms  in Germany.
However,  a strong  case  for individual  accounts  (whether  funded  or unfunded)  is that,
rather  than  legislating  when  people  can retire,  they  offer  the individual  the chance  to choose
when  to retire. This allows  much  greater  flexibility  in work  patterns  and forms of exit  from
the labour  market,  a point rightly  stressed  by Fox and Palmer  (1999)  and by Palmer  (1999).
An important  issue,  however,  is whether  similar  incentives  can  be built  into a defined  benefit
plan.
There are two further  initial observations. First, there is usually  a 'parametric'
element  to notional  accounts  reforms,  in that they apply  a minimum  retirement  age (see
Section  2 above). This pensionable  age usually  exceeds  the age at which  some (or even
most)  people  retired  before  notional  accounts.  This restricts  choice,  although  this limitation
is perhaps  desirable.  Secondly,  choice  will  also  be distorted  by other  parameters  of the tax
and benefit  system,  including  any  minimum  income  guarantees,  disabiliy  benefits,  and  so on.
The development  of a system  of individual  accounts  cannot  be undertaken  separately  from  a
(probably  parametric)  reform  strategy  of these components  of the overall  system.
31  As Palmer  (1999) writes:  'Social security  reforms  are inherently  political, and  in the  end  inevitably
represent  compromises  among  vanous  political  interests.  The  Swedish  refonn  is no exception.'  (op  6t,  p.1)
32Fox and Palmer (1999),  however, make a stronger case for a framework  based on
notional accounts:
"As benefits [in the Latvian reform] are completely and fully dependent on
contributions in the new system, a large part of the disincentive effect of a
traditional social insurance tax disappears.  Where benefits are unrelated to
contributions, the social insurance contribution becomes a tax, and like any
other tax embodies a loss of income and utility  to the payee. The closer benefits
are related to  contributions, the less loss of utility and income the  system
implies,  and the easier  administration  becomes." (ibid,  p.17)
Leaving aside the  issue of administrative  ease, the  argument underpinning this is
presumably  as follows. In standard  public finance analysis,  distortionary  taxes (such as those
levied on income) generate an excess burden  (welfare cost) relative to non-distortionary
taxes (lump sum taxes, for example). As Feldstein (1996) points out, the 'welfare  triangle'
gain associated  with the elimination  of this distortion by linking benefits to contributions in
a  pay-as-you-go system is  of  second order  magnitude to  the  gain from fzudin  these
individual accounts.  Financing the  system by  an  inferior mechanism (pay-as-you-go)
generates a first order welfare loss in equilibrium. Hassler and Lindbeck (1996) argue  that
the second order gain therefore depends on the increase in the degree of magina actuarial
fairness:  ie., on the relationship  between  marginal  contributions and marginal  benefits. In a
world with liquidity  constraints,  raising  the degree  of marginal  fairness  will  induce workers  to
increase labour supply, as this is the only means of changing second period consumption.
Even in this case, however, the authors show that  'full' linking of marginal benefits to
marginal  contributions does not automatically  guarantee  'actuarial  fairness'. It also depends
on the relative  rates of return to the funded and pay-as-you-go  programmes,  and the relative
rates of time preference of the public and the government.
In a more intuitive  sense, the prospective  welfare gain from switching  from a defined
benefit plan to  a notional accounts framework  relies on the change leading individuals  to
perceive  the pension contribution as a 'true' contribution to deferred pay and not simply a
payroll  tax. This is not self-evident. There is often public confusion over pension financing
mechanisms.  32  And notional accounts schemes  do, in practice, contain a variety of 'unfair'
32  Consumers of  pension products in the United Kingdom have become increasingly  sophisticated,
given the ability  to opt out of social security  benefits into a variety of funded, defined benefit and defined
contribution alternatives. Nevertheless  there is still much public confusion as to pension finance, as illustrated
byWhitehouse (2000).
33actuarial  transfers  (benefit  floors,  contribution  ceilings,  credits  for periods  out of the labour
force  etc).
The retirement  decision
An important  issue concerning  notional  accounts  is how they affect  the individual
retirement  decision.  To consider  the value  of retirement  in a choice-based  framework,  we
can envisage  individuals  (or households)  making  a forward-looking  decision  initially  of the
prospective  utility  value of the stream  of income  obtained  from retiring  at any particular
date. The  value  of this  prospective  income  flow  is (loosely): 3
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The choice  as to when  to retire  therefore  depends  on:
*  the expected  length  of life;
*  the disutility  attached  to work  relative  to retirement;
*  the expected  future  value  of earnings,  net of income  taxes;  and
*  the expected  future  value  of pension  benefits.
All  these are likely  to vary  over time. For example  the conditional  survival  probability  is
likely  to depend  on whether  the individual  retires  or not and  the pension  benefit  will  depend
on both the retirement  date  and  the trajectory  of earnings.  The utility  attached  to retirement
33  We can  write  this  formally  as  evaluating  a value  V(r)  of retiring  at date  r, which  is:
V(r) =  Efi  sIU  (Ys) + I  ±  Z  U, [b  J(r)]
5=t  S=1
where  w=work  and  r=retirement  and U is  the  utilty attached  to each  state. Y is the stream  of earned  income,
sunmned  up to the year  before  retirement.  D is the cumulative  survival  probabiliy;  thus P- is the probability  of
surviving  to year  s from  any  year  t. S is the time  horizon  (longest  expected  survival  date)  and  b,(r)  is  the benefit
conditional  on this  survival  date  (allowing  for,  eg, actuarial  adjustments)  given  retirement  at r. In the Stock  and
Wise  (1990)  model,  the individual  calculates  the 'option  value'  of each  retirement  date,  in this framework,  and
chooses  the retirement  date  that  maxirnises  the value  function  V(.).
34may  also  vary  over  time,  although  a standard  simplification  is to assume  that this is vanration
known  in advance. 34
Consider  the decision  to  work one more year.  By working an extra year, the
individual  gains  one more year  of earned  income  and also increases  the prospective  anmal
flow of pension  benefits. Against  this, the individual  has to evaluate  the disutility  from
having  one extra year's work rather than retirement. At some point, the disutility  of
shortening  retirement  will outweigh  the higher current and prospective  annual income
derived  from deferring  retirement.
Different  pension  plans  have  an effect  on retirement,  not just because  of different
levels  of generosity  but also because  they relate  to earned  income  in different  ways. As
suggested  in Section  3, a revalued  lifetime  earnings  defined benefit plan and a notional
account-type  defined contribution scheme have similar accrual structures, although
individuals  may perceive  the incentives  quite differently. Therefore,  we can ask, would
notional  accounts  defer retirement  relative  to  other types of plans: say, a 'backloaded'
defined  benefit  plan,  in which  pension  benefits  are related  in a non-linear  fashion  to lifetime
earnings  (linked,  perhaps,  only  to final  earnings),  or relative  to a funded  defined  contribution
plan? And  would  a notional  accounts  framework  represent  any  additional  improvement  on a
defined  benefit  plan  which  contained  the appropriate  actuarial  adjustments  and a revalued
lifetime  earnings  measure  in determining  pension  benefits?
The standard argument  concerning  a  'backloaded'  defined benefit plan is that
mandatory  retirement  is required  because  the marginal  pension  accrual  from remaining  in
the labour  force  is increasing  with scheme  duration. 35 Thus there is no a pnon reason  why
the incentive  structure  implicit  in notional  accounts  would  lead to later retirement  than a
non-linear  defined  benefit  plan  - indeed,  quite  the reverse. We observe  early  retirement
ages  in the latter  kind of plan  because  many  defined  benefit  schemes  contain  early  retirement
options without adequate  actuarial  penalties. In addition,  members  of private,  funded,
defined  benefit  plans generally  have other savings. So there is a pure income  effect  that
34  The  implicit  model  becomes  very  much  more  complicated  if individuals  may  subsequently  regret
retiring,  since  it is  unlikely  that  the  individual  can  simply  reverse  the  decision  costlessly.
35  The  seminal  reference  is Lazear  (1979).  For  further  discussion,  see  Disney  (1996)  Chapters  5 and  7,
and  Disney  and  Whitehouse  (1996,  1999).
35induces  earlier  retirement. 36 It is almost  universally  accepted  by pension  commentators
(although  not, unfortunately  by  all governments)  that elimination  of actuarially  overgenerous
early  retirement  incentives  are an essential  component  of pension  reform,  whtewr  the  ultame
d~  ofpesin  sdcn
In the case  of afidl  defined  contribution  plan,  we reach  a similar  conclusion,  but
by  a different  route. Consider  the accrual  structure  of a notional  account,  repeating  equation
(1), and compare  this with the accrual  structure  of a funded defined  contribution  plan
(equation  3):
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In equation  (3),  CCa  is the annuity  factor  that the insurer  would  apply  to a person
retiring  at time  R. The contributions,  as a fraction  of  wages,  compound  at the market  rate  of
return r, less any administrative  charges. In fact, r operates  in the same  way as the
revaluation  factor I in equation  (1).  Since  dynamic  efficiency  normally  holds, r alnost
certainly  exceeds  I. Likewise,  unless  there are substantial  transaction  costs  or market  failures
the annuity  rate,  aR  should  at least  be equal  to g so long as the annuity  can earn  the riskless
rate of interest  and  the riskless  rate of interest  is not less  than the growth  of the real  wage
bill. Therefore  a funded  defined  contribution  scheme  should  always  generate  a higher  fund
'return' from one extra year's  postponement  of annuitisation  than an unfunded  notional
accounts  programme.
Neither is there any particular  reason  why notional  accounts  should  extend the
working  life any more than a defined  benefit  scheme  in which  generous  early  retirement
options  have  been  phased  out and the appropriate  actuarial  adjustments  are made. Nearly
half of OECD countries  either  award  pension  increments  for deferring  retirement  past the
normal  age  or reduce  pensions  for early  retirement  (and  many  do both). These  adjustments
on average  add 61/2  per cent  to the pension  for each year's  delay  in claiming  the pension.
36  For illustrations,  see Disney,  Meghir and Whitehouse  (1994).
36This is similar  to the change  in pension for an extra year's  work in notional accounts
programmes.  So  retirement  incentives  are the same. 7
Overall,  therefore,  we conclude  that the incentives  to defer retirement  in a notional
accounts  scheme are litde different from those of a defined benefit scheme with the
appropriate  actuarial  adjustments.  If the idea  of 'individual  accounts'  is seen as central  to a
strategy  to defer retirement  decisions,  then the argument  for a shift to firikJ  individual
accounts  becomes  more  dominant.
6.  Conclusion
This paper  has considered  the implementation  of, and  rationale  for,  pension  reforms
based  on notional  accounts. (hese  are sometimes  known  as notional  defined  contribution
plans  or NDCs). The distinguishing  feature  of such reforms  is that a structure  of individual
accounts  is established,  in which contributions  notionally  accrue. No fund as such is
established  and the implicit  'return'  on such accounts  is determined  by a formula  linked  to
some  underlying  index  of long  run fiscal  sustainability.  I contrasted  this 'third  way'  with two
other  reform  strategies:  a 'parametric'  reform  strategy  (as  favoured  by the  WIF)  in which  the
existing  defined  benefit  plan  was fixed  up, and a transition  strategy  by which  the pension
scheme  was  largely  converted  to a set  of individualfirda  accounts.
After examining  some early precedents  for such schemes,  and describing  actual
reform  processes  in a number  of countries  along  notional  accounts  lines,  a generic  notional
accounts  reform  was evaluated  using  three broad  criteria.  First, a welfare  criterion:  is such  a
scheme 'fairer' and does it provide greater opportunities  for insurance? Secondly,  a
macroeconomic  criterion:  is such  a scheme  more  likely  to generate  fiscal  sustainability  and  be
more credible  than alternative  reform  packages?  Thirdly,  a microeconomic  criterion:  is the
scheme  likely  to reduce  incentives  to retire  early  more  than alternative  pension  plans?
From our literature survey  and arguments  presented  here we can conclude  that
whatever  the advantages  of the notional account  reforms,  they do not dominate  other
37  Outside the OECD, however, rather fewer systems have these adjustments (18 countries) and the
adjustment  rate is much lower (3½/2  per cent on average). Disney and Whitehouse (1999).
37strategies,  especially  those that introduce true diversification  between unfunded and funded
components. Furthermore,
*  Notional accounts may have some attractive  pIob& features in specific circumstances,
where  there are  limnits  on the feasibility  of other reform packages.
e  By automatically adjusting (albeit partially) the  retirement  age to  changes in  life
expectancy,  notional accounts may help avoid contentious political debate about the
explicit  normal  retirement age.
*  Nevertheless,  there is no economic  reason why notional accounts should induce people
to retire later than reforns that eliminate  actuarially  over-favourable  early  retirement in
public defined benefit plans and/or that introduce a funded component to the pension
system.
e  They may not be as transparent as sometimes argued, for example  with respect to the
complexities  of the indexation  and annuity  calculations.
e  Notional accounts cannot be 'actuarially  fair' so long as dynarmic  efficiency  holds, and
while magina 'fairness' can be  improved, this  process is  intrinsically similar to  a
'parametric'  reform of a defined benefit  plan.
*  Macroeconomic  risks affect notional accounts in the samne  way as any other pay-as-you-
go scheme.
*  Overall,  notional accounts  are, in effect, identical  to a well designed  defined benefit pay-
as-you-go  scheme  with reasonable actuarial  adjustments and benefits based on revalued
average  lifetirne  eamings.?
A strategy which combines 'parametric' features designed to  eliminate  the more
unsustainable  features of the existing  unfunded programme coupled with greater emphasis
on funding the 'insurance' element of the pension plan is either as good as or superior in
alnost every  dimension. The key point to bear in mind is that any reform to enhance the
sustainability  of a pension system  requires  that some members of some generations  lose out.
In a 'parametric'  reform, these costs are explicit. Even in a move to partial or complete
38  Again quoting Scherman (1999),  'It  seems as if a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) scheme
could be very accurately  characterized  as 'a thoroughly  reformed  pay-as-you-go  defined benefit  scheme.'"
38funding  of the pension  system,  it is, or should  be,  well  understood  that even  if the new  long
run equilibrium  increases  welfare,  the transition  will  involve  some  cost  to some  generations.
If the object  of reforms  that shift  traditional,  defined  benefit schemes  to notional
accounts  is to make  it transparent  that pension  claims  must be sustainable,  then it is unclear
why  such a reform should  be politically  superior. Some  people  must inevitably  find that
their  pensions  are  lower  in the new system  and  it is not apparent  why  they  would  feel  better
about  it because  of the reform. On the other  hand,  if it is  the complexities  of procedures  in
notional  accounts  that facilitate  such a reform,  then the claim  to greater  transparency  is
shallow.  Moreover,  there is a real risk  of costly  loss of credibility  when the realities  of the
system  are  revealed.  In the end,  there  is no getting  around  the fact  that educating  the voting
population  on the hard choices  associated  with  the sustainability  of pension  finances  is a key
challenge  for reformers  everywhere.
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Summary  Findings
The paper surveys  and evaluates  Notional Account-type pension reforms
(sometimes  known as Notional Defined Contribution plans, or NDCs).  The
distinguishing  feature  of such reforms  is  that a structure  of individual accounts
is established,  to which contributions notionally accrue.  No fund as  such
is established  and the implicit 'return' on such accounts is determined by
a formula linked to some underlying  index  of real wage  bill growth. Notional
Account (NA)-type  reforms  are described in a number  of countries: in Italy,
Latvia, Sweden  and Poland.
Notional Accounts are,  in effect,  identical to a well-designed defined  benefit
PAYG  scheme  with reasonable  actuarial adjustments  and a revalued  lifetime
earnings  basis  to pension benefits.  The paper argues  that, when examined
on grounds of 'actuarial fairness',  macroeconomic sustainability and
microeconomic incentives,  a reform strategy  that introduces Notional
Accounts as  the centrepiece  of the package  is inferior to a strategy  that 
combines  'parametric'  reforms  of the existing  unfunded  programme  with
greater  emphasis  on funding  the 'insurance'  element  of  the pension  plan.
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